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PLAYING CHICKEN AT THE WTO: 
DEFENDING AN ANIMAL WELFARE-BASED 
TRADE RESTRICTION UNDER GATT’S 
MORAL EXCEPTION 
Edward M. Thomas* 
Abstract: The European Parliament recently adopted a proposal mandat-
ing higher welfare standards for chicken used in meat production, includ-
ing a provision that would regulate or prohibit the importation of 
chicken not produced with the same high standards. Final passage of 
such a law would likely raise a World Trade Organization (WTO) com-
plaint by a chicken-exporting nation. This Note argues that under WTO 
precedent, a carefully crafted import ban could survive such a challenge 
by invoking the moral exception to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). In order to defend its regulation, however, the Euro-
pean Union must first attempt to negotiate a resolution with its trading 
partners, allow a flexible timeframe for nations to comply, provide excep-
tions for producers who abide by high standards, and mandate the same 
standards for both domestic and foreign producers. This Note argues that 
the European Union should follow these steps, and not back down from 
passing a much-needed law to improve animal welfare. 
Introduction 
 On February 14, 2006, the European Parliament officially adopted 
a proposal mandating higher welfare standards for broiler chicken, the 
type used in meat production.1 The proposal, if approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, would establish more humane standards on sanitation, 
stocking densities, ventilation, and surgical procedures such as de-
beaking and castration.2 This mandate would be the first E.U. regula-
                                                                                                                      
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
The author thanks Brenda Withers for her thoughtful advocacy of the issues underlying 
this Note. 
1 Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Minimum 
Rules for the Protection of Chickens Kept for Meat Production, Eur. Parl. Doc. P6_TA 
(2006), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT 
+TA+P6-TA-2006-0053+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [hereinafter EP Resolution on Broiler 
Chicken]; EP Calls for Stricter Welfare Criteria for Broiler Hens, Eur. Rep., Feb. 15, 2006, at 1. 
2 EP Calls for Stricter Criteria for Broiler Hens, supra note 1, at 1. 
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tion aimed explicitly at improving the welfare of broiler chicken, five 
million of which are slaughtered in the European Union each year.3 
 The passage of this proposed regulation followed a recent poll 
showing that a majority of Europeans—fifty-five percent—now agree 
that not enough importance is given to animal welfare in agricultural 
policy.4 In Greece, three quarters of respondents agreed with this view.5 
Even in Finland, which had the least concern for this issue, forty per-
cent of respondents said animal welfare should be accorded more at-
tention.6 Furthermore, forty-two percent of E.U. respondents stated that 
any new animal welfare law should give priority to broiler chicken, while 
forty-four percent favored protecting egg-producing battery hens.7 
 The inhumane living conditions of broiler chicken are well-doc-
umented.8 In most factory farms, chicken are kept in tightly packed 
sheds, unable even to spread their wings.9 Rapid weight gain, caused by 
overfeeding during the chickens’ six-week lifespan, leads to high occur-
rences of shattered bones and heart failure.10 Forced to live atop piles 
of their own excrement, up to eighty percent of chicken in the United 
Kingdom have open lesions and hock burns caused by the build-up of 
ammonia.11 Constant lighting, used to encourage perpetual feeding, 
denies regular rest.12 Awareness of these conditions in the European 
Union may explain the call for higher welfare standards.13 In Holland 
and Denmark, which have the most intensive farms in the European 
Union for the production of laying hens, a large percentage of citi-
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. 
4 Special Eurobarometer 229, European Commission, Attitudes of Consumers 
Towards the Welfare of Farmed Animals 64 (2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/food/animal/welfare/euro_barometer25_en.pdf. 
5 Id. at 65. 
6 Animal Welfare: Most Shoppers Willing to Pay More for Animal-Friendly Products, Says Poll, 
Eur. Rep., June 11, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Animal Welfare: Shoppers]. 
7 Id. 
8 See Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Campaign Facts—The 
True Cost of Cheap Chicken, http://chickens.rspca.org.uk (follow “Campaign Facts” hy-
perlink, then follow “The True Cost of Cheap Chicken” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 
2007); Vegetarian Society, Broiler Chickens Information Sheet, http://www.vegsoc.org/ 
info/broiler.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); EP Calls for Stricter Criteria for Broiler Hens, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
9 See Vegetarian Society, supra note 8. 
10 Id. 
11 Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, supra note 8. 
12 Id. 
13 See Animal Welfare: Shoppers, supra note 6, at 1. 
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zens—seventy-seven percent in both countries—are critical of current 
welfare standards.14 
 Given this public support, the European Parliament included in 
their proposal an amendment regarding the importation of broiler 
chicken from non-E.U. countries.15 Realizing that the benefits of this 
regulation would be undercut if non-E.U. producers continued to sup-
ply the European Union with chicken produced according to lower 
welfare standards, the amendment states: “Imports of chicken from 
third countries, which come from holdings that do not observe rules 
on the welfare of chickens for meat production equivalent to those ef-
fective in the E.U., should also be regulated and, where appropriate, 
prohibited.”16 
 If made law, this amendment could present a landmark case on 
the rarely invoked “moral exception” to free trade measures, codified 
under article XX(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).17 As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
a major economic power, the European Union’s passage of such an 
import ban would likely raise the ire of exporting nations that do not 
have similar welfare standards in place.18 As the European Union is on 
the forefront of animal welfare laws, this would include most nations 
that exports chicken to the European Union.19 Furthermore, nations 
that pay scant attention to animal welfare would be more likely to chal-
lenge this particular moral exception than other morally based, and 
politically sensitive, import restrictions (such as banning products made 
by child labor). How the WTO would rule on such a complaint by an 
exporting nation would define the current scope of free trade excep-
tions not only for animal welfare laws, but other morally based trade 
bans, as well.20 
 The likelihood of such an import restriction surviving challenge at 
the WTO depends on how the restriction is specifically drafted if and 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. 
15 EP Resolution on Broiler Chicken, supra note 1, amend. 8. 
16 Id. (emphasis added). 
17 See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 
689 (1998); Peter Stevenson, The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analysis of Their 
Adverse Impact on Animal Welfare, 8 Animal L. 107 (2002). 
18 See, e.g., Andre Nollkaemper, Introduction to Trapped by Furs? The Legality of 
the European Community’s Fur Import Ban in EC and International Law 1–2 (An-
dre Nollkaemper ed., 1997) (discussing Canada, the United States, and Russia’s opposition 
to a proposed 1991 E.U. import ban on pelts of animals caught with leghold traps); Char-
novitz, supra note 17, at 736. 
19 See Nollkaemper, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
20 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 744. 
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when it becomes law, and how a WTO arbitral panel, or the Appellate 
Body, interprets several key cases on trade discrimination.21 Given re-
cent holdings adopted by the WTO, however, it is possible that a care-
fully drafted E.U. import restriction on broiler hens—predicated on 
the moral exception codified under GATT’s article XX(a)—could sur-
vive challenge, and open the door to more national import restrictions 
aimed at improving animal welfare.22 
 Part I of this Note provides an introduction to the issues of free 
trade and animal welfare, highlighting the relevance of “process and 
production method” (PPM) distinctions. Part II provides an overview 
of the GATT articles relevant to this proposed import ban, and out-
lines the three-prong analysis for a morally based trade ban. Part III 
applies the current analysis to the European Union’s proposed broiler 
chicken import ban, and illustrates how the European Union can 
craft the regulation to increase the likelihood it will prevail in a trade 
dispute. Part IV provides several criticisms of the current analysis, and 
discusses appropriate changes necessary to safeguard morally based 
import restrictions. 
I. Animal Welfare-Based Import Restrictions: An Overview 
 Validly enacted import restrictions that promote the humane 
treatment of animals have long been undermined by international 
free trade agreements.23 While regulations such as banning cosmetics 
tested on animals, or prohibiting the use of cruel leg-hold traps in the 
fur trade, can take effect within domestic jurisdictions, they are diffi-
cult to enforce on imported products from foreign nations.24 This dif-
ficulty is the result of a global free trade regime that, in general, treats 
all products equally, regardless of their process and production meth-
ods (PPMs).25 When PPMs are not taken into consideration, nations 
cannot give preferential treatment to a product produced according 
to higher welfare standards.26 Consequently, domestic policy-makers— 
                                                                                                                      
21 See id. at 736–40. 
22 Id. 
23 Matthew Scully, Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, 
and the Call to Mercy 183–84 (2002); Stevenson, supra note 17, at 108–09. 
24 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 108–09. 
25 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regula-
tion of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 541 (2004); Laura Yavitz, The WTO and the 
Environment: The Shrimp Case That Created a New World Order, 16 J. Nat. Resources & 
Envtl. L. 203, 209 (2002). 
26 Kysar, supra note 25, at 542–43; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 125–26. 
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both in the European Union and elsewhere—are discouraged from 
passing even baseline animal welfare laws, knowing that foreign pro-
ducers will maintain access to their markets without conforming to 
such regulations.27 If an animal welfare law is passed, foreign products 
will likely be more competitive than their domestic counterparts, as 
domestic producers must abide by higher, and often more costly, pro-
duction standards.28 
 For these reasons, proposed animal welfare laws are unlikely to 
survive domestic industry opposition.29 This is the case despite the 
fact that a plurality of lawmakers, with the backing of their constitu-
ents, may agree that a practice such as testing cosmetics on animals is 
unacceptable.30 Even if a nation manages to pass an animal welfare 
measure—as is possible with the E.U. regulation on broiler chicken— 
trade laws that treat products equally can step in to prevent the tax, 
regulation, or import ban of the foreign goods.31 In this case, con-
sumers are supplied with the very products they charged their gov-
ernment with regulating. 
 Animal welfare advocates view global free trade agreements as a 
major reason for the lack of progress on welfare issues to date.32 The 
most important trade pact affecting animal welfare is GATT and its 
progeny, the WTO.33 Advocates argue that the WTO’s apparent un-
willingness to distinguish between products on the basis of PPMs 
means that standards on animal welfare are ignored in favor of com-
mercial interests, and that nations with the lowest standards end up 
setting the bar for others.34 Similar arguments are made in regards to 
the treatment of environmental, human rights, and labor standards 
under the WTO.35 
 Many free trade advocates, however, seek to prevent one nation 
from imposing its own animal welfare, environmental, or any other 
standard on other nations.36 Such advocates, including many develop-
                                                                                                                      
27 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 109; see Scully, supra note 23, at 184. 
28 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 109. 
29 See Scully, supra note 23, at 184. 
30 See, e.g., Nollkaemper, supra note 18, at 3–4 (discussing the successful passage of the 
E.U. fur import ban, which exporting nations later challenged on free trade grounds). 
31 Id. 
32 Scully, supra note 23, at 184. 
33 Id.; see Stevenson, supra note 17, at 109–10. 
34 See Scully, supra note 23, at 184. 
35 Id. 
36 Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 59, 62–63 (2002). 
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ing world representatives, view the WTO as a bulwark against regula-
tions that curb trade and/or advance protectionist policies.37 Their 
most compelling argument is that free trade should expand the pros-
perity of the developed world to poorer nations.38 For such advocates, 
the argument that PPMs should be taken into account amounts to a 
defense of expensive and resource-consuming regulations that disfa-
vor developing world producers.39 
 Attempting to reconcile these two valid objectives has proven 
highly problematic.40 Past GATT panel decisions, handed down before 
the advent of the WTO, strongly sided with the free trade argument.41 
The panels’ interpretations of key GATT provisions generally disal-
lowed consideration of PPM-based trade bans.42 Therefore, such rul-
ings have had a chilling effect on nations’ attempts to enact animal wel-
fare laws.43 However, more recent rulings of the WTO’s dispute panels 
and Appellate Body suggest that PPMs are not entirely disfavored un-
der international trade law.44 In certain circumstances, the WTO has 
held that PPM-based trade restrictions can be validly considered.45 
These cases did not explicitly deal with animal welfare regulations, but 
have the potential to beneficially affect future animal welfare trade re-
strictions.46 
 Furthermore, past WTO rulings have rarely dealt with a specific 
GATT exception that permits consideration of morally based regula-
tions.47 This moral exception to the general rule against discriminatory 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 59. 
41 See generally Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R 
(May 20, 1994), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadol- 
phinII.pdf [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II ]; Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Aug. 16, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (1993) [hereinafter 
Tuna-Dolphin I ]. 
42 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 111. 
43 See id. at 108–09. 
44 See generally Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001), reprinted in 8 Dispute Settle-
ment Reports 2001, at 6481 (2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II ]; Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), reprinted in 6 Dispute Settlement Reports 2001, at 
3239 (2001) [hereinafter Asbestos]; Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibitions 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), reprinted in 7 Dis-
pute Settlement Reports 1998, at 2755 (1998)[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I ]. 
45 Asbestos, supra note 44, at 3286–87; Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44, at 2792. 
46 See generally Asbestos, supra note 44; Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44. 
47 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 731. 
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trade, like other trade exceptions, is assumed to be tightly construed, 
and difficult for nations to successfully invoke.48 However, recent WTO 
decisions dealing with various other trade exceptions indicate that the 
moral exception may be more readily applied today.49 This fact is espe-
cially true when the law claiming the exception discriminates as mini-
mally as possible, and follows attempts by governments to resolve the 
issue bilaterally or multilaterally.50 A regulation that adheres to these 
guidelines stands the best chance of validly invoking the moral excep-
tion.51 
 Understanding how PPM-based import bans are increasingly ac-
cepted by the WTO is of primary importance to understanding how 
animal welfare laws can survive a WTO challenge.52 Additionally, un-
derstanding how the moral exception can be invoked to protect such 
PPM-based regulations becomes central to this analysis.53 Taken to-
gether, such changes mean that the European Union need not back 
down from its trade ban in the face of a foreign challenge, but should 
move forward to open the door to more animal welfare-based trade 
regulations.54 
 In this Note, PPMs refer to non-product-related PPMs, which are the 
PPMs most relevant to the animal welfare and trade debate.55 Such 
PPMs do not affect the physical characteristics of the final product.56 
Instead, they define the characteristics of the production process.57 For 
example, nail polish tested on animals and nail polish not tested on 
animals reach the consumer with the same physical characteristics.58 
However, the method of production can differ with regard to its testing 
on animals, which can subsequently affect the preference of regulators 
and consumers for one product over the other.59 An example that does 
not involve animal welfare, and that is a commonly banned practice, is 
                                                                                                                      
48 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Con-
tinuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 268, 273 (1997); Yavitz, supra note 25, at 
213. 
49 See generally Charnovitz, supra note 17. 
50 See Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 44, at 6514–17 (explaining the requirement that a na-
tion first seek to resolve a trade dispute through bilateral or multilateral negotiation). 
51 Id. 
52 See Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44, at 2792; Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 736–40. 
53 Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 736. 
54 See generally Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44; Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 736–40. 
55 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 111; Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 65–68. 
56 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 111. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
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trading products made by indentured children.60 Certainly, the physical 
characteristics of the thing produced are no different than a product 
made from paid adult labor.61 However, to most policymakers and con-
sumers, the difference in PPMs is highly relevant and factors into their 
choices regarding the regulation and consumption of such products.62 
II. GATT’s Relevant Articles and the Legal Test 
 In 1995, the WTO was established by re-enacting GATT, which had 
served as the primary international trade agreement since World War 
II.63 The WTO applied GATT’s articles to all of its Member States, 
which today include nearly 150 nations.64 Approximately thirty more 
nations are currently engaged in negotiations to join the WTO, mean-
ing that there are few international trade issues that GATT’s articles do 
not affect.65 Disputes over the application of GATT’s articles are ap-
pealed to the WTO.66 When disputes arise, arbitral panels of three indi-
viduals—appointed by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)—are 
formed to hear complaints from the aggrieved Member States.67 The 
losing nation can appeal the panel’s decision to the WTO’s Appellate 
Body.68 The Appellate Body then makes a final ruling, which will be 
adopted by the DSB unless a full consensus of the DSB chooses not to 
adopt it.69 Both panel decisions and Appellate Body decisions are bind-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 740–42. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. Product-related PPMs also exist and are the subject of their own controversies 
in trade law. See Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 65–66. These include production characteris-
tics that affect the physical characteristics of the final product. Id. Examples include the 
manufacture of goods with recycled material, or the manufacture of goods that may result 
in dangerous side effects—the inclusion of a cancer-causing ingredient, for example. Id. 
The distinction between non-product-related and product-related PPMs is not always clear, 
and subject to some debate. Id. However, welfare standards in the broiler chicken industry, 
in the context of this Note, are analyzed as non-product related PPMs. See id. 
63 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]; World Trade Org., The World Trade Organization . . . in 
Brief 8 (2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
64World Trade Org., supra note 63, at 7. 
65 Id. 
66 Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice 217 (2d. ed. 2001) 
(providing a comprehensive overview of the formation of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations); see World Trade Org., supra 
note 63, at 7. 
67 Bhala, supra note 66, at 216; see Yavitz, supra note 25, at 211. 
68 Bhala, supra note 66, at 217. 
69 Id. at 215. This system guarantees that a ruling will be adopted even if only one na-
tion votes in favor of adoption. Id. 
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ing on the parties to the specific dispute70 and increasingly inform fu-
ture decisions, though are not binding precedent.71 
 The WTO contains strong enforcement mechanisms in its dispute 
settlement procedures.72 Once a final panel or Appellate Body report is 
made, nations found in violation of GATT articles must either change 
their trade practices, pay fees to keep the existing trade measure in 
place, or face trade retaliation, sanctioned by the WTO, from other 
WTO Member States.73 Therefore, violations of GATT articles carry 
real consequences, and nations must often modify their domestic and 
import-based regulations so as not to face fines or trade sanctions on 
their own exports.74 
A. The Three GATT Articles on Anti-Discrimination 
 Three of GATT’s articles have direct bearing on the European 
Union’s proposed animal welfare law, but article XI is the most rele-
vant, and problematic, to the analysis.75 Article I provides that a na-
tion must treat the “like” products of another nation as favorably as it 
treats the products of any WTO Member State.76 This is the “General 
Most-Favored Nation” provision and ensures that no nation grant 
preference or discrimination to any “like product” of another nation, 
beyond what is granted to all nations party to the trade agreement.77 
 Article III also uses the term “like product,” and ensures that na-
tions do not grant their own domestic producers favorable treatment 
over foreign producers.78 Article III:4 states: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party im-
ported into the territory of any other contracting party shall 
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale . . . .79 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 214; Yavitz, supra note 25, at 211–12. 
72 Bhala, supra note 66, at 214. 
73 Id. at 215. 
74 Id. at 217–18; see Yavitz, supra note 25, at 212. 
75 GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI; see Stevenson, supra note 17, at 109. 
76 GATT, supra note 63, art. I. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. art. III. 
79 Id. art. III, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
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A finding of “like product” under article III means that a WTO mem-
ber cannot regulate, tax, or otherwise impede the internal sale of a 
foreign product, beyond how its domestic counterpart is treated.80 For 
instance, if cosmetics tested on animals and cosmetics not tested on 
animals satisfy the definition of “like products,” then nations may not 
pass regulations regarding the importation of the former under arti-
cle III.81 Alternatively, if the two products are not “like,” then nations 
may treat the importation of cosmetics tested on animals differently 
from domestic cosmetics not tested on animals.82 In this case, the im-
porting nation may tax, label or otherwise regulate the product, as 
long as domestic cosmetics tested on animals are similarly taxed or 
regulated.83 
 Article XI adds one relevant, and very powerful, provision to arti-
cles I and III by eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports.84 
While articles I and III bar nations from employing discriminatory 
regulations, such as labeling or taxes, article XI bars nations from set-
ting quotas, including complete embargoes, on foreign products.85 
Unlike articles I and III, article XI can be contravened even if no do-
mestic “like product” is produced.86 An outright ban on certain goods 
can violate article XI, even if those goods are not produced domesti-
cally or imported from any country besides the one in question.87 
While the question of whether products are “like” is necessary to the 
analysis of whether articles I or III is contravened, the same is not true 
for article XI.88 Instead, under article XI analysis, the issue becomes 
only whether a certain GATT exemption can protect the embargo.89 
 The importance of PPM distinctions to the interplay between ar-
ticles I and III, on the one hand, and article XI on the other, is criti-
cal.90 Animal welfare advocates prefer to have regulations analyzed 
under articles I or III, because under these articles nations can argue 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id.; see Schoenbaum, supra note 48, at 272; Yavitz, supra note 25, at 209. 
81 See Yavitz, supra note 25, at 209. 
82 See, e.g., Asbestos, supra note 44, at 3286–89 (finding that imported cement products 
containing cancer-causing chrysotile fibres are not “like” domestic cement products that 
do not contain such fibres, and that regulating the import of the chrysotile-based products 
does not violate GATT article III.4). 
83 See id. 
84 GATT, supra note 63, art. XI. 
85 See GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI. 
86 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13; see GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI. 
87 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13; see GATT, supra note 63, art. XI. 
88 See GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13. 
89 See GATT, supra note 63, art. XI; Charnovitz , supra note 17, at 737. 
90 See GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13. 
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that the imported products are not “like” the domestic products, and 
can therefore be regulated or restricted differently.91 However, ac-
cording to a note to GATT annex I, regulations that apply to a prod-
uct itself are analyzed as a potential article III violation, whereas PPM 
regulations are treated as potential article XI violations.92 Thus, a na-
tion’s attempt to prevent the importation of a good based on a PPM 
standard will be analyzed as a potential violation of the rule against 
setting embargoes or quotas.93 
 In effect, this interpretation of the annex I note means that a na-
tion attempting to condition access to its markets by requiring other 
nations to subscribe to a similar production standard bans the import 
of that product, rather than regulating different products differently.94 
Therefore, any regulation that seeks to restrict imports of products that 
do not meet the same animal welfare standards as the domestic product 
are treated as quantitative restrictions, and it is not necessary to differ-
entiate that product from any “like” domestic product.95 Again, the 
only way to defend a regulation that violates article XI’s rule against 
quantitative restrictions is to invoke one of the GATT exceptions.96 
                                                                                                                      
91 See GATT, supra note 63, arts. I, III, XI; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13. How-
ever, making a successful argument that products with different PPMs are not “like” prod-
ucts under article I or III analyses is also difficult under current Appellate Body jurispru-
dence. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 36; Kysar, supra note 25. While this Note focuses 
on whether an animal welfare-based import ban can survive challenge at the WTO, the 
question of whether, and to what extent, it is permitted to tax, label, or otherwise regulate 
products resulting from low welfare standards remains open. See generally Charnovitz, supra 
note 36. This area of the law is changing quickly, and considerations such as consumer 
preferences are increasingly taken into account by the WTO in deciding whether two 
products are “like” each other. See Asbestos, supra note 44, at 3275–89. These changes have 
profound effects on how animal products produced with low welfare standards can be 
taxed or labeled differently, but are not relevant to the discussion of an import ban on 
such a product. See id.; Kysar, supra note 25, at 541. 
92 GATT, supra note 63, annex I, ad art. III, para. 2. While not the topic of this Note, a 
strong argument could be made that PPM regulations should be analyzed under GATT 
articles I and III instead of article XI because consumer preferences substantively differen-
tiate products, and therefore justify nations in taxing, labeling and regulating products 
made with lower welfare standards. See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 134–35. 
93 GATT, supra note 63, annex I, ad art. III. 
94 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13. 
95 Id. 
96 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 737. This Note assumes that the European Parlia-
ment’s resolution, if and when it becomes law, will mandate a quantitative restriction on 
the importation of broiler chicken, rather than a tax, labeling or other non-quantitative 
requirement. This assumption is based on the text of the resolution as it now reads. See EP 
Resolution on Broiler Chicken, supra note 1, amend. 8. 
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B. The Exceptions to GATT’s Anti-Discrimination Articles 
 If a nation breaches any of the above articles, it may defend itself 
under one or more GATT exceptions, codified in article XX.97 Article 
XX, including the subsections relevant to the animal welfare debate, 
states: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . [or] (g) relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domes-
tic production or consumption . . . .98 
As Peter Stevenson and other animal welfare advocates have pointed 
out, these exceptions are not as favorable to environmental or animal 
welfare laws as they might seem to indicate.99 XX(a), XX(b), and 
XX(g) are significantly restricted in several ways, including limitations 
set out in the chapeau of article XX, deference to articles I, II, and XI, 
and uncertainty about the applicability of articles XX(b) and article 
XX(g).100 
1. The Chapeau’s Limiting Scope 
 The first restriction is that the three exceptions must be read in 
conjunction with the introductory language of article XX, termed the 
“chapeau,” which states that a regulation predicated on an exception 
must not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or a 
“disguised restriction on international trade.”101 While GATT panels 
and the Appellate Body previously avoided applying the chapeau in 
article XX disputes, today the reviewing body looks to factors such as 
                                                                                                                      
97 GATT, supra note 63, art. XX. 
98 Id. art. XX(a)–(b), (g) (emphasis added). 
99 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 122; Yavitz, supra note 25, at 213. 
100 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 122; Yavitz, supra note 25, at 213. Two of these ex-
ceptions are not relevant to this Note’s narrow focus on laws explicitly aimed at animal 
welfare, discussed infra Part II.B.3. 
101 GATT, supra note 63, art. XX. 
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whether claiming the article XX exception is merely a pretext for a 
trade restriction that contravenes GATT’s other articles.102 Specifically, 
a reviewing body will want to be assured that foreign and domestic 
producers are being held to precisely the same standard, and that 
claiming the exemption is the result of identifiable policies.103 
 In United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(U.S. Gasoline), the WTO Appellate Body found that the terms “arbi-
trary discrimination,” “unjustifiable discrimination,” and “disguised re-
striction” give meaning to each other.104 In that case, the Appellate 
Body found that a law that regulated foreign gasoline more closely than 
domestic gasoline—with regard to gasoline content under the Clean 
Air Act requirements—was a disguised restriction, because it assessed 
flexible baseline standards for domestic producers, while giving for-
eigners a strict statutory baseline.105 The Appellate Body held that less 
discriminatory options to achieve the same standard were more justifi-
able, such as providing the same flexible baseline standards to all pro-
ducers—a suggestion the United States countered as too costly and 
cumbersome to implement.106 Therefore, nations claiming an article 
XX exception must conform to the chapeau by justifying their regula-
tion as the least discriminatory option possible, and by treating all pro-
ducers equally.107 
2. Article XX’s Deference to Articles I, III, and XI 
 The next restriction on article XX exceptions comes from GATT 
and WTO rulings that articles I, III, and XI constitute “substantive” 
rights under GATT, while article XX rights are accorded less defer-
ence.108 In the landmark case of United States—Import Prohibitions of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle I ), the United States had 
attempted to block imports from foreign shrimp producers who re-
fused to certify the use of a device to protect sea turtles.109 In its analy-
sis, the Appellate Body stated that the right of nations to be free from 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Schoenbaum, supra note 48, at 274–76. 
103 See id. 
104 Appellate Body Report, United States—-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996), reprinted in 1 Dispute Settlement Reports 
1996, at 3, 22–23 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline]; Schoenbaum, supra note 48, at 275. 
105 U.S. Gasoline, supra note 104, at 27–28. 
106 Id. at 25–28. 
107 See id.; Schoenbaum, supra note 48, at 275. 
108 Charnovitz, supra note 36, at 82; see, e.g., Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44, at 2757. 
109 Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44, at 2757. 
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trade discrimination was a “substantive right,” and that invoking one of 
the article XX exceptions—in this case, article XX(g)—could “erode or 
render naught” that substantive right.110 The ruling referred to the abil-
ity of a nation to invoke an article XX exception merely as a right, but 
not a substantive right.111 Two years earlier, in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, a similar distinction was made.112 In striking down a Japanese 
law attempting to tax various types of alcohol at different levels, the 
Appellate Body described article III as providing a “sheltering scope” 
against any of the article XX exceptions invoked by Japan.113 In effect, 
WTO arbitral panels and the Appellate Body’s interpretations of GATT 
elevate the substantive rights of articles I, III, and XI, protecting them 
at the expense of the article XX exceptions.114 
3. The Inapplicability of Articles XX(b) and XX(g) 
 The final limitation is that articles XX(b) and XX(g) cannot 
necessarily be invoked to protect solely welfare-based regulations.115 
Article XX(b) allows for exceptions to free trade law to protect animal 
life and health, but it remains unclear whether this exception can be 
interpreted to apply to welfare-based regulations, as well.116 This un-
certainty is due to the fact that measures necessary to protect animal 
life or health are typically confined to preventing the spread of dis-
eases or to ensure the safety of food products for humans.117 There-
fore, the article XX(a) moral exception should be used to determine 
whether welfare-based laws can withstand scrutiny under international 
trade law on their own merits, without connection to their effect on 
public health.118 
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. at 2805. In this case, the United States attempted to apply the article XX(g) ex-
ception because its regulation was aimed at protecting endangered turtles, an exhaustible 
natural resources. Id. at 2757. 
111 Id. at 2805. 
112 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4. 1996), reprinted in 1 Dispute Settlement 
Reports 1996, at 97, 110 (1996) [hereinafter Japanese Taxes]. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 109–10. 
115 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 737. 
116 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 135–36. 
117 Id.; see, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R ( Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones] 
(ruling on a European Communities law restricting imports of meat containing growth 
hormones to prevent certain human illnesses). 
118 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 737; Stevenson, supra note 17, at 135–36. 
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 The article XX(g) exception on exhaustible natural resources is 
also inapplicable to the animal welfare analysis.119 While laws that fall 
under this exception often relate favorably to the protection of ani-
mals—limiting the incidental taking of turtles during shrimp trawling, 
for instance—this exception is not relevant to solely welfare-based 
regulations.120 This is a separate analysis from assessing whether regu-
lations with the singular purpose to lessen animal suffering can sur-
vive scrutiny at the WTO. 
 Consequently, the exception most relevant to this discussion is 
XX(a), which provides for exceptions “necessary to protect public 
morals.”121 Laws that would likely fall under XX(a), but neither XX(b) 
nor XX(g), include the banning of leg-hold traps in the fur trade and 
outlawing cosmetics tested on animals.122 These laws are not proposed 
in order to protect food safety or prevent the extinction of a certain 
species, and therefore, neither XX(b) nor XX(g) would apply.123 To 
date, the WTO has not ruled on the application of the moral exception 
to animal welfare, though it has ruled on articles XX(b) and XX(g).124 
 Notably, many laws that have potentially beneficial effects on ani-
mal well-being are indeed analyzed under XX(b) and XX(g) excep-
tions, such as regulations on hormone levels in dairy cows or laws to 
protect endangered species.125 In fact, animal welfare advocates are ar-
guing for the inclusion of the term “animal welfare” in article XX(b) in 
order to make it more feasible to enact laws that lessen animal suffering 
using this exception.126 In addition, some advocates argue for a more 
expansive definition of “animal health” under XX(b), which would de-
fine an animal’s health by how much pain it suffers.127 This definition 
follows from the premise that protecting the health of an animal 
should include all aspects of its well-being, including its level of suffer-
ing.128 Although these are important and evolving areas of the law af-
fecting animals,129 the underlying assumption in this analysis is that ar-
                                                                                                                      
119 See GATT, supra note 63, art. XX(g). 
120 See generally Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44. 
121 GATT, supra note 63, art. XX(a). 
122 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 108–09. 
123 See id. 
124 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 690. 
125 See generally Hormones, supra note 117; Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 44. 
126 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 135–36. 
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ticles XX(b) and XX(g) are generally inapplicable to solely welfare-
based import bans, and an animal welfare law would instead be ana-
lyzed under article XX(a).130 
C. The Legal Test 
 A law that conditions market access on the adoption of certain 
PPM standards by the exporting nation is a violation of article XI’s 
rule against quantitative restrictions.131 If a law restricts or bans the 
number of imports of any good, the WTO is not concerned with 
whether there is a “like” domestic or foreign product to compare it 
with, as it would with an import tax or labeling requirement under 
articles I and III.132 Instead, such a trade restriction must qualify as an 
article XX exception in order to survive WTO scrutiny.133 
 In order for a PPM-based import ban to survive as an article XX(a) 
moral exception, it must pass a three-prong test.134 No such case has yet 
been reviewed by the WTO, but as Steve Charnovitz argued in his in-
fluential article on the moral exception, given the textual similarities 
between the various article XX exceptions, the test will almost certainly 
be derived from past GATT and WTO decisions dealing with other ex-
ceptions, including XX(b) and XX(g).135 The test, which first appeared 
in U.S. Gasoline, determines whether the regulation: (1) advances a pol-
icy goal that fits within the scope of a “public moral”; (2) is “necessary” 
to protect that moral; and (3) is not a violation of the chapeau’s ban on 
trade discrimination or protectionism.136 Regulations can be found as 
                                                                                                                      
130 See Charnovitz, supra note 17, at 737 (discussing how a law banning leg-hold traps in 
the fur trade could not be exempted on XX(b) grounds). 
131 GATT, supra note 63, art. XI; see supra Part II.A. 
132 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 112–13. 
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illegal restraints on trade during any one prong of the analysis.137 If an 
animal welfare law is to survive, it must satisfy each prong of the test.138 
1. The First Prong: Does the Regulation Protect a Public Moral? 
 The exception at issue in an animal welfare-based import ban is 
article XX(a), the moral exception.139 Therefore, the first prong is 
whether the policy rationale for an import ban fits within the scope of 
protecting “public morals.”140 This prong is the easiest to satisfy, and 
simply asks whether the regulated conduct is one typically regulated by 
governments on a moral basis.141 Examples of conduct regulated on a 
moral basis likely include the trade in alcohol and drugs, obscene ma-
terials, gambling, and the trade in animals.142 Such actions are ones 
traditionally regulated by government under the rubric of protecting 
morals, and their regulation is generally accepted as within the scope of 
sovereign power.143 Precisely which moral a regulation seeks to defend 
is determinative in this prong.144 
2. The Second Prong: Is the Regulation Necessary? 
 The second prong asks whether the regulation in question is “nec-
essary” to protect public morals.145 A trade regulation will be deemed 
necessary only if (1) it is not outwardly directed, and (2) less trade re-
strictive alternatives are exhausted.146 Regulations that are explicitly 
directed at foreign producers are considered outwardly directed, and 
thus unnecessary.147 In addition, if alternative trade measures are avail-
able that are more consistent, or less inconsistent, with GATT rules, the 
                                                                                                                      
137 Yavitz, supra note 25, at 210; see Schoenbaum, supra note 48, at 276. 
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regulation will also be found unnecessary.148 While this is the current 
interpretation of the “necessary to” prong, criticism that this reading 
fundamentally misinterprets the plain language of article XX(a) is per-
suasive, and is laid out infra Part IV.B. 
a. The Outwardly Directed Nature of the Regulation 
 The first factor to be assessed under the “necessary” prong is the 
outwardly directed nature of the regulation.149 Laws that seek to protect 
human or animal health, or morals, will often compel producers in 
other nations to adjust their PPMs in order to comply.150 Therefore, 
outwardly directed regulations, also known as extraterritorial regula-
tions, will receive close scrutiny under this requirement, and be 
deemed unnecessary if they impermissibly regulate conduct beyond 
their borders.151 In the context of animal welfare, this situation is prob-
lematic because a ban on a certain PPM inherently affects foreign pro-
ducers who utilize that PPM and then want to export to the nation in 
question.152 Those foreign producers are then compelled to change 
their production methods in order to comply with another nation’s 
standards.153 This ban is precisely the type of regulation that might be 
problematic under the second prong, because it unnecessarily man-
dates changes in foreign nations.154 However, PPM-based trade bans 
with outward effects have recently survived WTO scrutiny, and may 
open the door to animal welfare trade bans being found valid under 
the “necessary” requirement, as well.155 
b. Less Trade-Restrictive Alternatives 
 A second factor to assess under this prong is whether trade regula-
tions besides an outright trade ban would be more consistent, or less 
inconsistent, with GATT rules.156 This is a highly fact-intensive prong, 
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2007] Animal Welfare and the Moral Exception 623 
and nations utilizing an import ban must put forth evidence to an arbi-
tral panel or the Appellate Body explaining why such a measure is as 
minimally trade-restrictive as possible in order to be “necessary.”157 One 
way for a nation to show that no measure exists that is more consistent 
with GATT is to put forth evidence that it attempted to negotiate, on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis, with its trading partners on the desired 
change.158 In fact, the WTO will likely find that an import ban or re-
striction is not “necessary” unless the regulating nation has first made 
an effort to resolve the issue through diplomacy and trade agree-
ment.159 However, these efforts alone are not enough to satisfy the 
“necessary” prong.160 
3. The Third Prong: Does the Regulation Violate the Chapeau? 
 The third prong of the analysis is whether the regulation “consti-
tute[s] a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”161 This language comes directly from the cha-
peau of article XX.162 One anomaly of this analysis is that because of 
the interpretation of “necessary” under the second prong, both the sec-
ond and third prongs pertain to anti-discrimination and least trade-
restrictive characteristics.163 
 Under the third prong, if the purpose of the regulation in ques-
tion is to confer a competitive advantage on the domestic industry, or 
to generally restrict trade, rather than to legitimately protect the morals 
of society, then the WTO will find the regulation does not merit excep-
tion.164 While it is true that a regulation can at once protect morals 
while also conferring a competitive advantage, the question under this 
prong is whether the regulation is a “disguised” attempt to confer the 
advantage.165 Therefore, a regulation explicitly aimed at domestic pro-
ducers, not just at foreigner producers, is more likely to satisfy this 
prong.166 
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III. Analysis of the European Union’s Broiler Chicken  
Import Ban Under GATT 
 To apply the above analysis to the European Union’s proposed 
trade restriction on broiler chicken, it is first important to note that this 
regulation would only be reviewed by the WTO should another Mem-
ber State file a complaint.167 Absent such a complaint, the European 
Union is free to pass any type of import restriction it wants.168 However, 
as the European Union is a major economic market and this law repre-
sents a significant barrier to chicken exporters, the regulation is likely 
to prompt a complaint.169 Therefore, this analysis is predicated on the 
European Union approving a quantitative import ban on broiler 
chicken that do not meet certain PPM welfare standards, and a com-
plaint being filed at the WTO by an exporting nation. 
 Secondly, the European Union may very well be persuaded not to 
pass such an import restriction, as was the case in the 1990s with a pro-
posed law on leg-hold traps in the fur industry.170 In that case, before 
the European Union approved the import regulation, the U.S. and Ca-
nadian governments threatened to bring suit in the WTO should such 
a law go into effect.171 The European Union backed down, never 
passed the regulation, and instead opted to negotiate several weaker 
treaties on fur imports with its trading partners.172 However, given the 
broiler chicken import ban’s prospects for satisfying the modern, three-
pronged analysis, the European Union should not back down in the 
face of such threats. 
A. The First Prong: Does the E.U. Broiler Chicken Regulation  
Protect a Public Moral? 
 The first prong of the analysis is whether raising welfare standards 
for broiler chicken is within the scope of the “public morals” excep-
tion.173 The rationale behind the law is to prevent the cruel treatment 
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of chicken in meat production.174 This regulation would likely satisfy 
the “public moral” requirement.175 Nations often define and regulate 
morals with regard to animal welfare.176 For instance, on June 8, 2006, 
U.S. Representatives Christopher Shays and Peter DeFazio introduced 
the Farm Animal Stewardship Purchasing Act to Congress.177 While the 
bill has yet to become law, its stated purpose is “to promote the humane 
treatment of animals” and “minimize[] [the] needless suffering” of 
pigs, cattle, chicken, and other animals reared for consumption.178 The 
bill requires that all suppliers of meat to U.S. government entities com-
ply with minimum standards of animal welfare.179 The primary purpose 
of the bill is to improve animal welfare, not to safeguard human health 
or prevent the extinction of certain species.180 Such laws illustrate that 
animal welfare is often regulated as a moral concern, and protecting 
such a moral falls within the scope of authority and discretion of sover-
eign nations.181 
 The language of the proposed E.U. regulation also focuses on 
improving animal welfare for the animals’ sake.182 For instance, the 
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development stated the follow-
ing in its Explanatory Note to this resolution: 
The new legislative proposal is a response to increasing public 
concern about animal welfare. The place occupied by animals 
in our societies has changed. Despite the industrialisation of 
farming, animals are now seen as sentient beings which have a 
right to respect. This is a long-overdue victory for Aristotle, 
who believed that Man (sometimes) differed from animals in 
his ability to reason, but shared with them a capacity for 
movement and, above all, feeling.183 
Therefore, it is evident that the essential impetus for the law is the 
moral consideration of animal suffering.184 The WTO will likely de-
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termine that a law aimed at improving welfare standards for broiler 
chickens falls into the category of a moral exception.185 
B. The Second Prong: Is the E.U. Broiler Chicken Regulation “Necessary”? 
 The second prong of the analysis is whether the proposed broiler 
chicken regulation is “necessary” to achieve the E.U. goal of promoting 
higher animal welfare standards.186 This prong asks whether the regula-
tion is the least trade-restrictive option possible, and whether all other 
options have been exhausted.187 
1. The Outwardly Directed Nature of the Import Ban 
 The first factor to consider is the outwardly directed nature of the 
regulation.188 The import ban will take effect by conditioning access to 
the E.U. market on exporting countries’ adoption of welfare standards 
similar to the proposed E.U. law.189 The European Union will likely ar-
gue that its broiler chicken law is only attempting to regulate the prod-
ucts that are bought and sold within its jurisdiction, and therefore is 
necessary to safeguard public morals.190 The argument is that nations 
should possess the sovereign power to set such standards for the goods 
consumed internally, regardless of whether such standards also have 
outward effects.191 
 Recent WTO Appellate Body ruling supports this argument.192 
Import bans based on PPM standards, which have outward effects, are 
no longer per se invalid under WTO precedent.193 While a GATT panel 
in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna-Dolphin II ) prohib-
ited a PPM import ban on the grounds of its extrajurisdictional effects, 
the 1998 and 2001 rulings in United States—Import Prohibitions of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle I and Shrimp-Turtle II, respec-
tively) altered this holding.194 In the Shrimp-Turtle cases, the United 
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States prohibited the importation of shrimp caught by foreign trawlers 
that did not certify the use of a turtle-excluder device (TED) to spare 
the killing of endangered sea turtles.195 Several countries raised a com-
plaint at the WTO on grounds that this ban violated article XI.196 The 
United States sought to defend itself under articles XX(b) and XX(g).197 
 In Shrimp-Turtle I, the Appellate Body held that the regulation was 
unfairly discriminatory against foreign nations, but on very narrow 
grounds.198 Most importantly, the Appellate Body did not attack the 
outward effects of the regulation, even though the United States im-
posed a PPM standard on how shrimp were caught outside of its terri-
torial waters.199 Instead, the Appellate Body found that the regulation 
was not crafted as narrowly as possible—it did not allow shrimp export-
ers enough time to alter their fishing methods, nor did it include alter-
native methods, besides the TED, to protect turtles.200 Therefore, the 
Appellate Body found the regulation violated the “unjustifiable” and 
“arbitrary” requirement of the chapeau, but not the outward-effects test 
of the necessary prong.201 Three years after the first ruling, the Appel-
late Body in Shrimp-Turtle II found that upon subsequent revision of the 
regulation by the United States—permitting nations more time to 
comply, and accepting certification of measures that are “comparable 
in effectiveness” to the TED—the regulation satisfied the “arbitrary dis-
crimination” prong, and thus did not violate GATT.202 
 In these landmark rulings, the Appellate Body recognized that ar-
ticle XX exceptions will sometimes permit laws that condition export-
ers’ access to domestic markets on compliance with certain PPM stan-
dards.203 The Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle II explicitly adopted the 
following from the Panel’s report: 
It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting 
countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies . . . 
renders a measure a priori incapable of justification under ar-
ticle XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of 
the specific exceptions of article XX inutile, a result abhor-
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rent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to ap-
ply.204 
Unlike Tuna-Dolphin II, the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle I was un-
willing to assert that the mere presence of outward effects failed this 
prong of the analysis.205 
 Therefore, the broiler chicken regulation will not necessarily fail 
the second prong, simply because it has outward effects.206 Under 
Shrimp-Turtle I reasoning, an import ban may be required to protect 
human health, endangered species, or morals, even if the ban affects 
how products will be caught or produced outside of a nation’s juris-
diction.207 The Appellate Body recognized that otherwise, citizens 
would eventually be supplied with the products it charged its govern-
ment with prohibiting.208 This belated realization by the Appellate 
Body in this case is a step forward for animal welfare laws, at least with 
regard to passing the second prong of the article XX test.209 
 Although Shrimp-Turtle I did not strike down a PPM-based import 
restriction because of its outward effects, two factors weigh against its 
direct application to the European Union’s broiler chicken law.210 First, 
the Appellate Body in that case analyzed the article XX(g) claim, which 
states that a regulation must be “relat[ed] to” protecting natural re-
sources, rather than the “necessary to” standard of articles XX(a) and 
XX(b).211 Therefore, it is not clear whether an import regulation based 
on morals, when analyzed under an article XX(a) “necessary to” stan-
dard, would face higher, or different, scrutiny with regard to the out-
ward effects of the regulation.212 What is clear is that the necessary 
prong requires a more exacting requirement that no other less incon-
sistent trade measures exist.213 This requirement does not exist under 
the “related to” analysis.214 Therefore, the Shrimp-Turtle I case suggests 
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that PPM-based import restrictions are not per se unnecessary, simply 
because they have outward effects.215 But the analysis from Shrimp-Turtle 
I still requires a showing under a “necessary to” analysis that no less in-
consistent trade measures exist.216 
 Second, the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle I went on to find that a 
“nexus” existed between the foreign turtles and the United States.217 
This finding permitted the Appellate Body to hold that the ban could 
be justified under article XX(g).218 However, it is not clear whether 
such a nexus would exist between the European Union and broiler 
chickens in other countries.219 In Shrimp-Turtle I, the Appellate Body 
conceded that although the United States does not have jurisdiction to 
protect foreign turtles, the U.S. regulation protects foreign turtles.220 It 
reconciled this discrepancy by pointing to the fact that sea turtles are 
migratory, and presumed to enter and exit U.S. waters during their life-
times.221 The Appellate Body used that contention to establish the req-
uisite nexus between the United States and the turtles.222 This conten-
tion, which is contestable, allowed the Appellate Body to find that such 
a link gives the United States the ability to protect foreign turtles 
through an import ban on shrimp caught without TEDs.223 
 In order to satisfy this prong, the European Union therefore must 
argue that its import ban is not regulating the conduct of all foreign 
chicken producers, but only those that choose to export into the Euro-
pean Union.224 If import bans based on PPM standards are not per se 
unenforceable after Shrimp-Turtle I, then a law protecting the welfare of 
animals, as applied to products flowing across E.U. borders, should be 
enforceable.225 As for the nexus requirement in Shrimp-Turtle I, the 
European Union should argue that in order for it to mandate higher 
welfare standards for its own chicken, it must apply that regulation 
evenly to all chicken imports.226 Otherwise, the law itself might be sub-
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ject to domestic industry opposition or evasion, and the chances of the 
European Union’s long-term success in raising its own chicken welfare 
standards could be imperiled.227 Furthermore, the European Union 
should emphasize that in Shrimp-Turtle I, a very weak nexus was estab-
lished between the foreign turtles and the ability of the United States to 
protect them.228 That nexus was based only on the possibility that tur-
tles caught by other nations might migrate inside U.S. waters during 
their lifetime.229 However, the Appellate Body did not require proof of 
this contention, and held that the possibility alone was enough.230 
2. Less Trade-Restrictive Alternatives 
 Under the second prong, a nation challenging the ban will likely 
raise the issue that alternative measures to protect the welfare of 
chicken are less trade-restrictive than an import ban.231 The Appellate 
Body will then use a fact-based analysis to determine whether such al-
ternatives are feasible.232 If the reviewing body concludes that less trade-
restrictive alternatives are feasible, the article XX(a) exception will be 
inapplicable.233 However, import bans that are as least discriminatory 
and as flexible as possible will be viewed more favorably by the Appel-
late Body when compared to alternatives.234 
 In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (Asbestos), France attempted to ban imports of 
products made with chrysotile asbestos fibers, a known carcinogen.235 
Canada, which exported cement-based products containing asbestos to 
France, challenged the import ban as a violation of several trade provi-
sions, including article XI.236 France defended its action by invoking 
article XX(b), claiming the measure was necessary to protect human 
health.237 In its analysis of the “necessary to” requirement, the Appel-
late Body considered Canada’s argument that a “reasonably available 
alternative” existed to the import ban, in the form of a “controlled use” 
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provision.238 Such an alternative law would state that imports of asbes-
tos could continue, but that France could control the use of the asbes-
tos through internationally recognized safety precautions, use restric-
tions, and other methods.239 The Appellate Body rejected that argu-
ment, stating that, “[i]n our view, France could not reasonably be 
expected to employ any alternative measure if that measure would in-
volve a continuation of the very risk that the [import ban] seeks to 
‘halt.’”240 As such, the Appellate Body found that France was within its 
discretion to set a complete import ban on asbestos, and that the con-
trolled use alternative was not “reasonably available.”241 
 This case suggests a degree of latitude for nations to craft the 
types of regulations they deem necessary to protect certain policy 
goals.242 The fact that Canada could allege a less trade-restrictive al-
ternative was not enough to supersede France’s discretion to ban as-
bestos altogether.243 The Appellate Body conceded that the alternative 
was possible, but remained convinced that France’s ban on asbestos 
was necessary to protect human health.244 The E.U. import ban on 
broiler chicken may be accorded the same deference, in light of al-
ternatives such as a labeling or taxing scheme.245 The result in Asbestos 
is an encouraging holding for the E.U. law, because less trade-
restrictive alternatives to the import ban will always exist, but the fea-
sibility of such alternative will not, per se, invalidate the ban.246 
 The Asbestos case is not entirely favorable to a potential analysis of 
the necessity of the E.U. broiler chicken regulation, however.247 In its 
ruling, the Appellate Body relied on language from Korea—Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, which held that public 
policies viewed as “more vital or important” are easier to find necessary 
to protect.248 Here, the short shrift historically given to animal welfare 
issues by most nations, and presumably by Appellate Body members, 
will likely become relevant.249 The importance of protecting French 
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citizens from cancer was central to the analysis of finding the import 
ban “necessary.”250 The Appellate Body found such protection “vital 
and important in the highest degree.”251 Whether a law protecting the 
welfare of animals will receive the same deference is not at all clear, and 
unsettled by Appellate Body precedent.252 However, a fair assumption 
would be that animal welfare laws would not be deemed as vital and 
important as laws that seek to prevent cancer in humans.253 
 While it makes sense to accord greater deference to laws seeking 
to protect human health than to animal welfare, the focus of an arti-
cle XX(a) analysis should remain on balancing a valid moral with re-
strictions on free trade.254 Under such an analysis, animal welfare laws 
fall squarely within the purview of moral consideration,255 and an im-
port ban that is as minimally discriminatory and flexible as possible 
lessens the adverse impact of the trade restriction.256 As such, the Eu-
ropean Union should attempt to negotiate bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with nations that export chicken to the European Union. 
Under current WTO precedent, this process is an important step to-
ward showing that the import ban is “necessary” due to the exhaus-
tion of other alternatives, and that the ban is not a protectionist 
measure.257 
 Another way for the European Union to demonstrate that other 
less restrictive alternatives do not exist would be to include an excep-
tion to the ban for chicken exporters who comply with the same high 
welfare standards, even if located in nations that do not require those 
same standards. In Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes (Thai-Cigarettes), an import ban on all foreign ciga-
rettes did not satisfy the “necessary” prong because it banned all for-
eign producers outright, without permitting any producers to qualify 
for an exemption.258 The Thai government defended its import ban 
under article XX(b), in order to protect its citizens from the dangers 
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of smoking.259 A GATT panel found that alternatives such as a ban on 
cigarette advertising could achieve the same goal without being trade 
restrictive, and deemed the regulation a trade violation.260 Had the 
Thai government allowed some foreign producers to import into 
Thailand, such as those that agreed not to advertise, it is more likely 
the GATT panel would have upheld the regulation.261 Therefore, the 
European Union should allow chicken producers to apply for certifi-
cation based on their use of the same welfare standards.262 
 The European Union should also implement reasonable and 
flexible guidelines for foreign producers to reach the desired welfare 
standards.263 In Shrimp-Turtle I, the U.S. regulation was found invalid 
because it did not provide a reasonable amount of time for foreign 
producers to comply with the regulation, and the United States did not 
allow other conservation techniques, besides TEDs, to be used.264 As 
such, foreign chicken exporters should be given a certain reasonable 
amount of time to come into compliance with the regulation.265 In ad-
dition, various humane methods for housing, feeding, caring for, and 
slaughtering chickens should be permitted, in order to make the re-
quirement on foreign producers less burdensome.266 This standard is 
similar to the provision in Shrimp-Turtle II, which required the United 
States to institute a more flexible certification process, rather than man-
dating only one method of turtle protection.267 
 All of these factors, taken together, assure that a proposed import 
ban on broiler chicken is as “necessary” and as least trade-restrictive as 
possible, thus making it more likely to survive challenge. 
C. The Third Prong: Does the E.U. Broiler Chicken Regulation  
Violate the Chapeau? 
 If the E.U. import regulation passes the second prong, it is unlikely 
to fail the third prong, because much of the analysis of anti-
discrimination and least trade-restrictive alternatives now takes place 
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under the “necessary” requirement.268 Even the Thai-Cigarettes case, 
which banned all foreign cigarette imports while permitting domestic 
cigarette production, did not reach the third prong analysis, because it 
failed the second prong.269 This regulation clearly violated the third 
prong’s chapeau requirement, as the cigarette import ban is a quintes-
sential example of a protectionist measure.270 
 Therefore, the limited analysis of this prong would focus on 
whether foreign and domestic producers are being held to the same 
standard for broiler chicken welfare.271 The proposed European Par-
liament resolution mandates compliance across the European Union, 
with specific provisions for chicken welfare, such as stocking densities, 
lighting, and surgical procedures.272 E.U. producers will certainly be 
the first and primary targets of this regulation, and their compliance 
is a main goal for the law’s drafters.273 There seems to be little ques-
tion about whether the European Union’s own chicken industry will 
be held to these standards.274 Thus, as long as the welfare standards 
are equally applied, and not arbitrarily imposed on foreign producers, 
the third prong will likely be satisfied.275 
IV. Criticisms of the Current Article XX Analysis 
 Serious criticism of the current article XX analysis exists, and 
should be taken into account by the Appellate Body or arbitral panel 
if it is confronted with a trade dispute on the E.U. broiler chicken law, 
or any other import regulation premised on the moral exception.276 
Remedying the current analysis will make it more likely that the Eu-
ropean Union’s import ban will pass scrutiny, and will more effectively 
balance free trade and protection of public morals.277 
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A. Deference to Articles I, III, and XI Is Incorrect 
 The WTO’s interpretation of the article XX exceptions has been 
criticized by some animal welfare advocates and trade scholars.278 First 
of all, the deference given to articles I, III, and XI is not necessarily 
consistent with article XX’s introductory heading.279 This heading 
explicitly states that when certain factors are met, “nothing” shall pre-
vent the passage of regulations seeking to invoke the exception.280 
Furthermore, the plain language of article XX reads more like “sub-
stantive rights” than articles I, III, and XI, which merely establish gen-
eral principles against trade discrimination and quotas.281 The excep-
tions exist precisely to give nations the essential “right” to protect 
their own morals, human and animal life, and threatened natural re-
sources.282 Nevertheless, current Appellate Body rulings have inter-
preted the relationship of the GATT articles by giving greater defer-
ence to the principle of non-discriminatory trade, rather than the 
right of nations to protect certain moral.283 Doing away with this def-
erence would make it more likely that morally based import regula-
tions, including the European Union’s proposed import ban, would 
satisfy the three-pronged test by lessening the presumption that the 
exception cannot be invoked.284 
B. Misinterpretation of “Necessary to” 
 The current Appellate Body analysis of the “necessary to” prong 
is also erroneous.285 There is no reason to interpret the phrase “neces-
sary to” as stating that a regulation must be as least trade-restrictive as 
any alternative, or that all alternatives need be exhausted.286 This in-
terpretation is a fundamental misreading of the text.287 The plain 
meaning of the language states that the regulation must be necessary 
in order protect the specific policy goal in question.288 Therefore, in 
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the second prong of an article XX(a) analysis, the question should be 
whether the regulation is reasonably capable of protecting the moral 
in question, or whether the moral would be protected without the 
regulation.289 The analysis should not focus on whether it is less trade-
restrictive than other measures.290 
 This alternate interpretation is supported by the fact that the cur-
rent interpretation makes the third prong of the analysis redundant.291 
The third prong’s chapeau analysis already takes into account whether 
a restriction is too trade-restrictive, because it focuses on whether a 
measure is “unjustified” in light of other alternatives.292 Such an as-
sessment inherently involves consideration of whether alternative 
measures are more feasible.293 Therefore, the current interpretation of 
the second prong analysis forces an unnecessary analysis of alternative 
trade measures and consistency with other GATT standards.294 
 In addition, if the drafters had meant “necessary to” to be inter-
preted as a “least trade-restrictive” requirement, they would have made 
such a requirement more explicit.295 The chapeau is explicit on evaluat-
ing a regulation based on protectionist and discriminatory concerns, 
but the “necessary to” prong is not.296 Therefore, the plain meaning of 
the text should control, and the plain meaning is that the regulation 
must only be “necessary to protect public morals.”297 Under this revised 
analysis, a minimally discriminatory, flexible E.U. import ban on broiler 
chicken would be more likely to satisfy the “necessary to” require-
ment.298 
Conclusion 
 The European Union should not back down from its attempt to 
improve the welfare of broiler chicken. Regulating imports from na-
tions that do not meet the same welfare standards is the an effective 
method to ensure the humane treatment of chicken. Furthermore, 
such an import ban does not mandate that other nations accept the 
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European Union’s standards on animal welfare. It only mandates that 
if foreign nations want to bring their goods into the European Union, 
they must comply with the same standards as E.U. producers. 
 While it is uncertain whether such an import ban would survive a 
challenge at the WTO, several factors make it more likely that it will. 
First, the European Union should pursue a good faith effort to nego-
tiate international agreements on this issue with its chief chicken ex-
porters. Second, the European Union should allow nations a flexible 
timeframe to comply with the new standards. Third, the European 
Union should provide an exception for chicken producers who abide 
by the European Union’s high standards, even if located in nations 
that do not mandate those standards. Finally, the European Union 
should ensure that this regulation applies identically to all E.U. and 
foreign producers. 
 In addition, the Appellate Body should re-evaluate its interpreta-
tion of several key components of GATT. First, there is no reason to 
presume article XX’s broad deference to articles I, III, and XI. Article 
XX rights are “substantive” as well. Second, “necessary to” should be 
interpreted to relate only to the regulation’s efficacy in protecting the 
moral in question, not to whether other alternatives are less trade-
restrictive. Such changes in interpretation, coupled with an E.U. law 
as non-protectionist, non-discriminatory and flexible as possible, 
make it likely that the E.U. broiler chicken regulation, or similar ani-
mal welfare-based import restrictions, will be upheld at the WTO. 
